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5 March 1981

... **FBIS 40TH YEAR 1941-81** ...

Latin America Report

(FOUO 5/81)



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26 February 1981

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On behalf of all of us in FBIS I wish to express appreciation to our readers who have guided our efforts throughout the years.

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LATIN AMERICA REPORT

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COUNTRY SECTION

INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS

COLUMNIST SURVEYS SOUTH ATLANTIC ROLE IN U.S.-L.A. RELATIONS

Buenos Aires LA OPINION in Spanish 11 Jan 81 p 10

[Article by Sergio Ceron: "U.S. Wants To Consolidate Argentina in the South Atlantic"]

[Text] The strategic and economic importance of the South Atlantic is constantly receiving recognition by the specialists who outline new doctrines in which that region takes on special significance. Starting with the first manifestations of this phenomenon, the southern part of America has ceased being regarded a marginal territory for experts in strategy and, on the contrary, is rapidly rising to a priority ranking.

Of course, this implies that Argentina is also losing its former marginal status and is becoming, consequently, a nation that must be taken into account.

Last week offers us two definite examples of what is happening in this field, with the visit of the Egyptian minister of foreign relations [sic; should read minister of state for foreign affairs], Butrus Ghali, to Buenos Aires and with statements by Republican spokesmen made in Washington and emphasizing that Ronald Reagan's Administration will attempt to regain the "friends" of the United States, especially Latin American governments stirred up by the Carter Administration under pretext of the struggle for human rights.

But let us proceed step by step and begin by analyzing the mission carried out by the Egyptian foreign minister [sic]. It is possible to infer from the movement and talks held by Ghali in Argentina that the government of Anwar El-Sadat, turned perceptibly toward the West and held in check in his area of influence by the Arab nations uncompromisingly opposed to Israel, is seeking to expand his maneuvering field on a worldwide basis. Consequently, he is proposing the establishment of a dialog between Africa and Latin America and, specifically, between Egypt and Argentina. For obvious reasons, rapprochement between the two continents may give the nations on them a greater margin of negotiating capability with regard to the great powers.

"I believe that it is absolutely necessary to strengthen solidarity between the various regions of the south," the visitor said. "Our two continents have one and the same ocean and, just as Europe, the United States and Canada have consolidated a dialog that is enabling them to design a common policy, in the same way we must set up a dialog between Latin America and Africa, between Egypt and Argentina."

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Sadat is definitely not unaware that, while strategic and political interests are bringing the great powers in confrontation with each other, on the other hand interests of an economic nature are beginning to coincide when it is a question of establishing the rules of the game for negotiating with developing countries. In general, there is talk of a North-South dialog in which the northern hemisphere would represent the industrialized countries and the southern hemisphere the suppliers of raw materials and importers of capital goods and technology.

Therefore, the paradox occurs that while Egypt has placed itself unhesitatingly on the side of the West in its confrontation in the sphere of the power dispute with the Soviet Union, its economic interests often clash with the interests of its allies. The same is true of Argentina, a country with a Western propensity, which has been compelled to trade with the Soviet world owing to the clumsiness, blindness and egoism of the large European nations and of the United States.

We can perceive, moreover, that Butros Ghali is expressing the understanding of his government concerning the increasing role played by the South Atlantic and, likewise, concerning the leadership incumbent on Argentina and Brazil in that region. With an appreciable difference between these two nations. While, because of its energy and food production capacity, Argentina is in a position to handle a policy independent of any kind of pressure, Brazil, on the other hand, is subject to the good will of the oil exporting countries, among which the influence of a leftist ideology is evident. A break with the socialist regime of Iraq, for example, might cut off supply of almost half of Brazil's oil requirements and bring it to the brink of collapse.

Therefore, Egypt is mentioning explicitly its interest in establishing a dialog with Argentina, in which, undoubtedly, greater elasticity is noted for carrying out a foreign policy of its own and, in a certain way, a bold policy.

The Beagle Channel and the Falkland Islands

At the same time, wire agencies send us echoes from Washington concerning confidential remarks made to press correspondents by spokesmen of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee belonging to the Republican Party.

They state that the new administration of Ronald Reagan is concerned with finding a rapid solution to problems that, like the border dispute between Argentina and Chile and the dispute over the Falkland Islands, may create prospects of instability in the hemisphere.

Associated Press maintains, in a 5 January dispatch, that "in sources close to the new Senate Foreign Relations Committee it has been learned that the possibility of encouraging an early return of the Falkland Islands to Argentina is said to be under consideration."

The American agency adds that Argentina has been negotiating return of the southern archipelago, but the steps taken in accordance with the provisions of the United Nations with regard to decolonization have been evasive up to now.

Although the sources declined to commit the opinion of the new Republican administration any further on this thorny dispute, they did not fail to admit that, at other times, Washington has used its influence with Great Britain for settling other decolonization problems. The example of Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) was mentioned as the most evident one.

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The question is why the Americans must be particularly interested in having Argentina recover its unredeemed lands. And here we have to apply the old, but never wornout statement made by Disraeli about England: "Great Britain has no permanent allies. It has permanent interests."

The concern of the world strategy of the United States aims at obtaining control of the vital navigation routes passing by South America. Only an alliance with Brazil and especially with Argentina can make it easy for its fleet, occupied in a large number of areas of the world, to confront the increasing presence of the modern, powerful Soviet fleet off the coasts of Africa. A constant threat impends from there over the transportation of bulk oil, food and strategic minerals to the United States, Western Europe and Japan. Two-thirds of the raw materials that move American industry come by way of the sea accesses of South American and southern Africa.

Similar reasons can be put forth with regard to the Beagle Channel problem. In the eyes of Washington, it seems advisable for Argentina to settle its disputes in that region and consolidate its sea presence in the South Atlantic. The possibility of having bases in its southern ports, on the Falklands and on the Georgia and South Sandwich islands would give the Argentine fleet -- whose technological renovation has been announced for the next 5-year period -- the possibility of becoming a valuable strategic ally of the United States. Great Britain, occupied in Europe and having abandoned its responsibility in the Far East and Middle East in the last few decades, can in no way make up, at a distance of thousands of miles, for the presence of Argentina.

Latin America, a Priority

The men who interpret the foreign policy that the new administration will apply have stated that they do not want Latin America to be the backyard of the United States, but, rather, its vestibule.

The new doctrine has its authors in the sector of professors in Georgetown University and Stanford University who supported the Republican candidate and who are now preparing to cover in part the posts of advisers and officials in the State Department and on the National Security Council. We can recall, among their spokesmen, Roger Fontaine who visited Buenos Aires several times in the second half of 1980, accompanied on one of them by LtGen Daniel Graham, Reagan's strategic adviser on hemisphere affairs. Both justified the role of Latin America in their country's overall foreign policy and they proclaimed that, beyond the State Department's ideological lucubrations in the Derian [assistant secretary for human rights and humanitarian Affairs] era, they would be treated as friends to the extent to which it would suit American interests. Subsequently, Alexander Haig, nominated by Reagan for the post of secretary of state, said explicitly that the moderately military governments in Latin America were actually the ones that were protecting man's rights and dignity in the face of the enslavement imposed by subversive terrorism.

But the one who, at this time, is actually calling the shots is the nominee for ambassadorship to the United Nations, Jeanne Kirkpatrick, a conservative Democrat, professor in Georgetown University and connected with the American Enterprise Institute. Kirkpatrick attacked, in several lectures and periodical articles, Brzezinski's position that decreed a strategic disregard for Latin America and that, instead, focused attention of United States policy on the Middle East and Europe.

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Of course, no one is trying to deny the priority that these two theaters represent for Washington, but Kirkpatrick and her friends realize that an overall view of the world strategic and political situation requires the United States to consolidate its rearguard firmly. Otherwise, it will not have specific weight for operating in other areas much farther from its primary bases of operation. The three Americas -- forgive the expression -- must become a bulwark from which the Union may establish a very solid economic and military structure that will enable it to have a worldwide maneuvering depth on the basis of very strong logistic support.

Although Brzezinski laid the philosophical groundwork for Carter's policy in the hemisphere, the doctrine has its background in Henry Kissinger and was carried out by a Republican administration. The phenomenon can be explained from a cultural point of view. Both are native-born Europeans. Culturally speaking, they are "European-centric" and view the world with the distorted eyesight with which statesmen in that region are accustomed to viewing it. It does not fail to be revealing that, when the new conceptions of United States foreign policy are beginning to open a way and, among other points, aim at justifying the role of Latin America, their spokesmen represent intellectual trends emerging from universities least influenced by European culture. Today, without doubt, the social democracy of the Old Continent and American liberal progressivism influence each other mutually. The first high-level reaction has been given, precisely, by the rejection of the Democrat administration by the people of the United States. Therefore, we said once that a new political era seems to be opening up in the nation to the north.

The announcement of a visit by two House of Representatives committees to Buenos Aires is contributing to an intensification of our appraisals of the changes looming up, already very evident in the Union.

The president of the nation, Jorge Rafael Videla, and the ambassador of the United States, Harry Schlaudeman, spoke of this matter during a talk held Wednesday in the executive mansion. Diplomatic observers believe that the length of the talk makes it possible to infer that in its course topics broader than a mere parliamentary visit were discussed within the spectrum of matters involving bilateral relations.

The first open, and to some extent spectacular, step toward rapprochement with the region was taken last Monday by Ronald Reagan who talked extensively with the president of Mexico, Jose Lopez Portillo. The latter, who did not fail to display his fear that the Republican presence in the White House and in the Capitol would mean a return to the "big stick" policy, was comforted, apparently, by the frankness and clearness with which Reagan expressed his desire to consolidate the ties with his neighbor and to hold constant consultations with Mexico on every bilateral problem or problems common to the hemisphere.

Therefore, it is premature to anticipate in detail what the lines of United States foreign policy will be, but there can be no doubt already that changes will be evident and that in them a better relationship with Latin America and especially with our country is contemplated.

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COUNTRY SECTION

INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS

JAMAICAN YOUTHS STUDYING IN CUBA BROUGHT HOME

Brigade Program Criticized

PA262015 Havana PRELA in Spanish 1556 GMT 26 Jan 81

[Text] Kingston, 23 Jan (AFP)--One hundred and twenty young Jamaican men and women who were in Cuba participating in the controversial brigade program returned to the island yesterday by government plane.

Under the brigade program established by former leftist Prime Minister Michael Manley, since 1975 Jamaican youths were sent to Cuba for the apparent purpose of receiving training in construction techniques. Nevertheless, upon their return several brigade members formed ideological groups.

The program has been severely criticized here since 30 October 1980, the day of the general elections, when documents concerning the brigades disappeared mysteriously from the Housing Ministry.

Jamaican Students Protest

FL032331 St George's Domestic Service in English 2300 GMT 3 Feb 81

[Excerpts] An organization of Jamaican students in Cuba has written to Prime Minister Edward Seaga expressing concern and disappointment over the government's termination of what is known as the brigadista program. Our correspondent in Jamaica has the details to that story:

[begin recording] This program, which dates back to 1975, allowed unemployed Jamaican youths to go to Cuba for 1 year of training in construction skills. In its letter to the prime minister, the organization of Jamaican students in Cuba criticized the government for recalling the brigadistas when most of them had only 1 month to go before completing their course and graduating. The organization questioned whether this move was as a result of previous JLP [Jamaica Labor Party] charges that the youths were receiving military training. It denied these allegations and called on the JLP to either provide evidence or to withdraw them. The students said the recall of the brigadistas could not be to the best interest of the Jamaican youths, especially as the government had no plan to provide them with jobs or with further training. The organization of Jamaican students in Cuba has also brought the matter to the attention of the Jamaica Council of Churches and the Jamaica Council for Human Rights. [end recording]

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High-ranking political and diplomatic leaders in San Jose, information center of the area, have speculated about the reasons the Sandinist junta had to make a decision with such a high political price. One of the most obvious deductions is that Sandinism is at a juncture of escalation within the totalitarianization of its political conduct.

Newsmen who have taken the time to review the agenda of the seminar attribute the Nicaraguan Government's angry reaction to the fact that the meeting had planned to analyze not only freedom of expression under the Sandinist regime, but also decree 511 by which the Sandinist junta established a strict system of censorship. It is so rigorous that these latest events are placed completely outside the knowledge of the Nicaraguan people since the news media are banned from dealing with the subject. Central American political circles are also speculating about the next steps of Jose Estaban Gonzalez, the tenacious leader of the Human Rights Commission who since 1967 has been denouncing the excesses of the successive de facto regimes of force which have ruled Nicaragua.

Gonzalez was to land in the Augusto Cesar Sandino airport in Managua a few hours after the Human Rights Commission was declared illegal, its headquarters raided and its files confiscated by the police. Gonzalez was coming from Rome where he met in private with the pope.

One of the possibilities is that Gonzalez will be imprisoned. This would lead to a direct clash with Christian democracy, particularly with the Venezuelan Government of Luis Herrera Campins which since the hard days of the anti-Somozist struggle expressed its regard for Jose Esteban Gonzalez.

These events are particularly important for Venezuela since the precarious Nicaraguan economy depends on the supply of Venezuelan petroleum at subsidized prices as part of a joint supply plan with Mexico. This plan would collapse if there were serious complications such as the imprisonment of Jose Esteban Gonzalez.

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COUNTRY SECTION

ARGENTINA

FIRMENICH GRANTS INTERVIEW TO CUBAN MAGAZINE

Havana BOHEMIA in Spanish 9 Jan 81 pp 66-71

[Interview with Mario E. Firmenich, secretary general of the Peronist Montonero Movement, by Pedro Rioseco in Havana; date not given]

[Text] With the ovation with which the delegates to the Second Congress of the Communist Party of Cuba responded to the resounding final phrases of the central report read by our commander in chief still ringing in our ears, we left the Convention Palace to keep the appointment made with the highest leader of the Argentine Montoneros. He is in addition one of the youngest revolutionary leaders on the continent, one of those most experienced in the struggle against the repressive bodies throughout the Southern Cone, which in view of the demands of the Argentine military regime, are uniting their efforts in order physically to eliminate and destroy the combative organizations. Shortly before midnight, we arrived at the house where the outstanding Argentine revolutionary leader, who in his 33 years of life has spent more than 10 under the difficult conditions of clandestine struggle, is staying as a guest. We were prepared to make use of the opportunity, in the style suggested by the very name of the Montoneros (which dates back to the last century, when the cowboys of the Argentine plains attacked the troops of the pro-British oligarchy en masse ["monton" means mass or pile]), and so armed with a "monton" of questions, we launched our journalistic attack.

[Question] Could you, Comrade Firmenich, give us a characterization of the present political situation in Argentina?

[Answer] In the current political situation, we must distinguish two ingredients: one we can call of a temporary nature, and the other of a strategic sort.

To understand this situation, which is synthesized in the political phenomenon of Viola's appointment to succeed Videla in usurping the presidential authority, we can say very briefly, from the strategic viewpoint, that this military dictatorship set for itself secret plans, and drafted a strategy with three political-military stages prior to the consolidation of the economic model.

These three phases were, first of all, the coup d'etat as such, pursuant to the so-called "ripe fruit" theory, carrying off a coup d'etat against an entirely deteriorated political regime, and thereby controlling the political power while simultaneously liquidating the operation of political parties and unions, trade

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associations in general, not only of the workers but of the owners as well. This was phase one.

Phase two, called "reorganization," was strictly speaking the phase of repression. In other words that in which the successive annihilation of the non-Peronist guerrilla organizations, first of all, was sought, and then the Montoneros second, and thirdly the base level of the workers' movement.

This reorganization stage was to conclude in theory with the reorganization of new political parties and trade unions. In other words, it was presumed that by then the preexisting forces would have been politically and militarily liquidated.

And phase three, the so-called consolidation stage, sought to consolidate the preceding two phases politically. It was planned to achieve this consolidation with the creation of a political movement of a majority nature in support of the military government. This was the idea.

The coup d'etat phase, as everyone knows, came off without major problems, for in fact, the mistakes of Isabel Peron made that task relatively easy. Then came the phase of repression, which left the balance now internationally famous--30,000 individuals who have "disappeared."

On one occasion General Viola admitted in a public address that there were 8,000 unidentified dead. The number in prison is rather difficult to specify, since often individuals are reported released when they have not been. But the basic outcome from the point of view of repression is 30,000 disappeared. And this figure is not exaggerated.

The problem is that in this phase of repression or military annihilation, the dictatorship has failed to achieve its goals. It has not achieved them with us nor has it with the workers' movement, despite the fact that both we and the workers' movement suffered great losses in this brutal offensive of the "dirty war," as it has been officially termed.

To illustrate the figures, the casualties we have suffered come to some 5,000 men, while the casualties of the base-level workers' movement come to some 10,000 representatives.

It is obvious that the cost to us, to the people as well as the organization in general, has been high, but in no way was the enemy able to achieve his goal. On the contrary, political phenomena which were the opposite of those predicted occurred. Beginning last year, there has been an increasing process of accumulation of popular power in various sectors, various mass organizations, such that the consolidation phase which Viola intended to carry out lost any meaning, since there is politically nothing to consolidate, there is no civil confirmation of what was achieved in the repressive phase, that is to say the outcome of that repression. This is the situation from the strategic point of view. There was, following the death of General Peron, a very clear deterioration of the balance of forces working against the popular sector and in favor of the oligarcho-imperialists, consummated in the coup d'etat and the final offensive launched

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against the workers' movement, the people's movement. But beginning in 1979, this process was reversed, and currently the process is adding forces favorable to the people. Obviously, it has not yet succeeded in imbalancing, or even balancing, the ratio of forces, but what we are stressing is the change in the trend in the process.

While the balance of forces was changing in favor of the enemy during his offensive, due to the destruction of popular organizations, since 20 April 1979, the date of the general strike called by the combative sector of the trade union movement, and the launching of the counteroffensive we pursued last year, a reversal in this process of deterioration in the resistance of the people's forces occurred, converting it into a growing process of accumulation of power in organizations in the people's sector, with the reactionary forces in the country steadily deteriorating politically. This is the strategic situation.

From the situational point of view, we should have arrived by this date at the beginning of the consolidation phase, according to the time schedule established prior to the coup d'etat. This was to involve the appointment of a high-ranking retired officer to be the leader of this political movement, intended mainly to support the dictatorial process. The person chosen for this function was General Viola.

In other words, this gentleman was chosen at that time to serve as president, presumably during the consolidation phase.

But as the balance of forces has not developed in the way that they hoped, the reality of matters will have nothing to do with their intentions. And moreover, the fact is that in order to be able to pursue a minimal policy of winning over certain sectors by the regime, a change in the economic policy is absolutely essential.

It is not possible to establish bases, either on the level of the middle strata--what do I mean by middle strata?--not even on the level of the middle bourgeois sectors, or even the oligarchic sectors in the interior who are opposed to the economic policy today. They may be for or against the dictatorial process, but they are certainly against the economic policy.

In other words, it is essential in order to pursue any effort to establish a political movement, to change the economic policy in such a way as to obtain concessions for the social base which is to be won over, and this is incompatible with the present economic model, which is not of a situational but of a strategic nature, and which has not been completed.

In this connection we could differentiate Argentina, if you will, from Chile. With identical economic models being pursued in both countries, the degree of completion of this economic model in Argentina is lagging far behind in terms of the level of concentration of capital achieved, the level of unemployment achieved, and the modification of the economic infrastructure is far behind.

As a point of reference: when it comes to railroad policy, Argentina has a network of about 40,000 kilometers of railroad line. It was announced in 1976

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that only 10,000 kilometers of railroad lines would be left, known as the trunk network, while the other 30,000 kilometers would be taken up, including branch lines, and eliminated completely. This has a historic background somewhat more complex where the regions are concerned, but this was the intention.

Concretely, some 5,000 kilometers of the scheduled 30,000 kilometers of railroad track were closed down and taken up. Why? Because whenever they began to take up tracks, the railroad network in the country stopped. The trade union struggle of the railroad workers prevented the continuation of the economic plan where the railroad policy was concerned. And this is happening in various sectors of political life.

Thus currently, with Viola, we have three major guidelines which will come in conflict as soon as Viola takes office as president.

One is the intention of the military dictatorship and Viola himself in this plan for political consolidation.

Second is the line set forth very clearly to Viola by Rockefeller, during his last visit to Argentina, calling for no change in the economic policy.

Third is the popular expectation of making use of the objective weakness involved in the takeover by Viola from Videla to overthrow the dictatorship, as has repeatedly occurred in Argentina with preceding dictatorships.

In other words, if there is an expectation on the level of the popular movement in Argentina today, it is to transform Viola into Lanusse. Not that Viola is democratic, and Lanusse was not either. However if the cycle of the defeat of dictatorships repeats itself, there is a possibility of forcing a retreat and obtaining concessions of sectors of power for the popular movement.

This is the hope for triumph, an approximate idea of the hope for triumph for the people's movement, based on an objective weakness in the dictatorship.

This weakness is the result of political deterioration and the fact that under the present circumstances--this is a very ambitious strategic project for the reactionary classes, but one half-accomplished--the changeover represents an objective break in the continuity Rockefeller and Martinez de Hoz want.

Although they are no more than demagogic and minimal actions directed at oligarchic sectors in the interior, or certain strata of the bourgeoisie, from whom what is wanted are economic concessions to be used as a political base, this interrupts, weakens or delays the process of concentration of capital. This is a process which has not been concluded and which has to deal with the reaction of a popular movement which is advancing in a counteroffensive against an enemy it has perfectly identified.

[Question] After a brief pause, we questioned our interlocutor, who speaks rapidly, but with precise ideas, and without much of a Buenos Aires accent, about a second aspect, having to do with the role Argentina plays in the imperialist strategy on the continent, its relationship to Brazil in this strategy, and on a

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more specific level, how the internal difficulties in the country are being evidenced in the light of the pursuit of this global strategy. He drew briefly on his cigarette and began to speak again.

[Answer] This is obviously related to what we have seen recently. With the passage of time it has become clearer what the basic proposal pursued by this dictatorship is and its links with the neighboring dictatorial processes. It is also indicative to all the political militants in the popular movements in the Southern Cone that when we read documents from other neighboring countries, we think they are referring to our country. The process, the language, the trade union laws, the political time schedules, the constitutional changes, the exchange of repressive collaborations--it is all much the same, identical.

This uniformity, which has no recent precedent at least, is explained by the fact that in the final analysis all of these regimes are supporting a given structure of a regional nature, a part of a strategy of a world nature.

None of these regimes announced its intentions at the beginning, since given their reactionary nature, they would have had difficulty obtaining support, approval, a consensus, or even acquiescence of any kind from any sector.

In other words, years had to pass before all of these elements became clear as they carried out their policy.

One of the elements which in our view has just revealed this strategy is the pact signed by the dictatorship in Argentina and by Brazil during the two meetings President Videla had with President Figueiredo. And to this must be added another series of agreements charting a course: between Argentina and Uruguay; between Brazil, Argentina and Paraguay on the Plate River Basin; the establishment of the Bolivian dictatorship by the Argentine dictatorship and with the acquiescence of Brazil; and despite the lesser contradictions, the very clear identification with the Pinochet dictatorship. The disagreements with the latter have to do with power, the distribution of assets in order to negotiate with imperialist capital. At a recent meeting of the OAS, it was clearly seen how the Southern Cone Pact functioned diplomatically in defense of the judgment of Argentina and Bolivia, while Chile, supposedly at odds with Argentina over the Beagle Channel problem, showed absolute solidarity with the Argentine dictatorship.

In other words, all of these dictatorships have the same intention, which is regional reorganization, within the framework of world reorganization of the international division of labor. All of this comes within the context of the trilateral proposal to deal with the structural crisis in capitalism.

The recent tour by Rockefeller through South American countries, including Chile, Argentina and Brazil, is no happenstance, nor is the fact that the same European enterprises--for energy and armaments--are those established in Argentina and Brazil. The Argentine-Brazilian nuclear agreement is no accident. This plan for reorganization is based on the alteration or reorganization of markets--they call them "economic space"--which also presupposed the need for the destruction of the LAFTA as well, in order to eliminate the hindrances of a legal nature existing for regional trade, basically the compulsory nature of the LAFTA agreements of a

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multilateral nature, preventing the bilateral absorption of smaller markets by Argentina and Brazil. It is no happenstance that Garcia Meza (Bolivia) withdrew from the Andean Pact, nor is the economic boycott, since the Andean Pact is the economic enemy of this expansion or this model of regional reorganization in South America. It is based on an axis--we might call it the Buenos Aires-Sao Paulo axis--incorporating in a single market the whole of the southern part of Brazil, Uruguay and the Argentine coast, which includes the entire pampas zone, which is without a doubt, in terms of number of inhabitants and income per capita, the most important market in Latin America.

In addition, it has abundant hydroelectric energy, which everyone knows is the cheapest, and the infrastructure for the exploitation of this energy is being developed. Within this, the main industrial base is Brazil, and this then is the origin for the economic plan of the Argentine dictatorship, the economic plan of Minister Martinez de Hoz, to destroy Argentine industry, to destroy industry of domestic origin, what we might call the national bourgeoisie, and the withdrawal of industry of monopolistic foreign origin.

It will be recalled that General Motors withdrew from Argentina some years ago. It simply packed up its factory plant and left, leaving the empty premises behind.

The Fiat tractor plant has virtually shut down, and the Deutz tractor plant has also closed, because it has been transferred to Brazil, so that farm machinery is now imported from Brazil by Argentina. Even the cold storage industry is breaking down in Argentina, because there are a number of measures in the Videla-Figueiredo agreements, one pertaining to animal health in the frontier zones, and others in the customs sector which in the final analysis permit the sale of cattle on the hoof by Argentina to Brazil for processing by the Brazilian slaughtering industry.

In other words, it is the dismantling of the Argentine industrial apparatus, including that with capital of domestic origin, and not to speak of the capital of state origin, the first to be converted to the private sector for subsequent liquidation. Then the capital of the national bourgeoisie is liquidated, and even monopolistic foreign capital, which is transferred, because it happens that these same monopolistic enterprises have had branches in Argentina and Brazil for many years.

The model has given Brazil industrial priority, because among other things it seems to date to have offered the greatest political stability, lowest manpower costs, and most limited tradition of organized struggle, since the workers' movement in Brazil is the youngest. The workers' movement in Argentina could not be incorporated in the developmental model which was tried at the beginning of the 1960s.

For all these reasons, what the economic model presumes is a country with a capacity for 15 million inhabitants at a maximum. Thus there are some 13 million excess inhabitants. An agroindustrial country, a model in which industry survives--this is what the Bunge and Born monopoly--the industrial monopoly which processes food products, i.e. the industrial processing of farm crops, known as industrial crops--represents for Argentina.

And that is all, except that now oil chemistry may remain too, since Brazil does not have a significantly developed oil industry. Apparently oil chemistry would

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remain in Argentina, to work from Argentina toward Brazil, and Argentina would remain the financial center of this market.

The rest of the industrial development, including agroindustrial undertakings, farm machinery and heavy machinery, would be headquartered in the Sao Paulo zone. And there is the development of the war industry as an inducement to the Argentine armed forces to go along with such a model. The only element in the industrial model which presupposes industrial expansion. In any case this development of the war industry would remain far below the level of the Brazilian war industry, which has developed as a very important exporter of armaments. This bribe offered to the Argentine armed forces is obvious, because there is even talk of transferring this war industry to the private sector while it is still in state hands.

There are a number of generals, some of them retired--including Gen Lopez Aufranc, a famous reactionary from the Lanusse government era--who have publicly urged the need to transfer the war industry to the private sector because "there is the concern that this economic and strategic potential might fall into the hands of an irresponsible civil government in the future." Thus the safe thing is to make it private and obviously this benefits the military.

This is not an entirely new invention on the part of the Argentine oligarchy. The emergence of the Argentine oligarchy, with General Roca, during the conquest of the desert in the last century, was based on the distribution of the land won from the Indians through genocide, to be distributed, given out, to the troops which participated in the massacre, with the number of hectares based on rank. So much for a general, so much for a soldier, so much for a sergeant, etc. Obviously, with one great difference. The soldiers and sergeants, logically, were given a few hectares in the middle of the desert, which they then sold for a bottle of alcohol, and so the concentration of the land in the hands of these military commanders who make up the oligarchy came about.

A similar phenomenon is occurring at present, when in the final analysis there is no possibility of the political implementation of the oligarchic model, and military implementation is needed.

The problem is to resolve political authority by means of military tyranny, and the way to guarantee unity of the armed forces in solid support of this project is to offer them membership in the dominant classes, in this case now with the war industry.

This is the economic model we said is half-completed, because the unemployment index is not at the level it should be from the point of view of the oligarchic interests, nor is the level of breakdown in our national industry, and even the index of conversion of state enterprises into private ones is not where it should be from the point of view of their interests.

And when it comes to the destruction of state services, such as the railroads, they are far from having reached a level satisfactory to them. This is the situation. They have not even succeeded in controlling inflation, which is running at about 100 percent per year.

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Thus this model, with its gradualist technique, would require some years more to achieve its goals. Otherwise, it would have to be made more profound in terms of what is known as a shock policy, which is to some extent what has been done this year, 1980, the last year remaining for Minister Martinez de Hoz, although this is no longer politically tolerable in Argentina. This is the situation.

[Question] The question arises as a logical continuation of what has been said above: How has this economic policy affected the Argentine workers' class and the deterioration of the standard of living, since Argentina is one country in the South American area which has, because of its industrial power, had a certain standard of living above that of neighboring countries, and does this policy directly affect the standard of living, of workers' sectors above all?

The immediate answer was that of a man who understands the problems of his country profoundly.

[Answer] The first very clear indication, and it will also be seen that this is a textbook case, because the same thing is seen in all the countries of the area, is the reduction of real wages by 50 percent.

Concretely, this means decreasing the extent to which the wage-earners share in the net product from the 48-percent level reached in 1974 to the approximately 27 percent which is seen now. In monetary terms this means armed robbery, more or less--it really is armed robbery--of something like \$10 billion per year from the working class.

As to the other indices, we can see, for example, in education, that dropouts from the primary schools, which are supposedly free and attendance compulsory, is running about 50 percent prior to completion of the 7th grade, and the percentages for school dropouts on the secondary and university levels are similar, or a little less.

In addition, whole universities have shut down, whole university courses, and hospitals--one of the most important hospitals in Argentina was closed in 1976, and the children's hospital has just been shut down and then reopened.

Now it is necessary to pay fees for care at the hospitals, which were free, and one must also pay fees now at the universities, which were free.

As to housing, the rent law was promulgated, astronomically increasing rental sums by the end of 1 1/2 or 2 years.

This meant that about 200,000 families in Buenos Aires had to lose their homes for lack of ability to pay the rent, and therefore, as there is no construction of low-cost housing, and no access to any other, the only other practical solution for people in these circumstances was to go and live with relatives.

Well, one could contemplate piles of figures. The increase in infant mortality, the increase in malnutrition. There has been a change in the diet. Everyone knows that the Argentine diet was very good, because it is a country with more than enough meat. However, actually, the real consumption of meat is decreasing, and in addition there is a redistribution of consumption.

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In the final analysis, all of the social indices, whether for public health, housing, education, leisure activities or social projects are being seriously affected.

The social projects of the trade unions, which covered many aspects of public health and leisure, were confiscated, stolen away! These social projects involved a total figure of about \$1.5 to 2 billion per year, this sum coming from the wage contributions of workers affiliated with the trade unions, and all the installations, such as vacation colonies and clinics of very fine quality in terms of infrastructure and medical care, were built and their maintenance provided out of the contributions of the workers, from withholdings from members' wages, obviously shared and supported by all the members of the trade union.

This has been eliminated, taken away from the trade unions, and they have practically ceased to provide the aid services they formerly did. The conclusion is that from the point of view of public health, education and housing, the indices have been truly much worse than regrettable in these last 4 years.

From the point of view of organization, obviously again with regard to the trade union structure which existed historically in Argentina, the workers' movement today has suffered a substantial loss. For the first time in 35 years, the Argentine movement has been without its trade union organizations for a prolonged period, and this has led to political changes in the country. Among other things, there has been a change in the trade union tactics, with implications of a political nature already visible, and with greater future significance. Why? Because the loss of the trade union apparatus was accompanied by repression on the level of factory representatives' bodies. In other words, blows were struck on the levels of the structure, the superstructure of the trade union apparatus, and the base organizations.

These were replaced in the struggle by a new form of organization with a semi-clandestine basis, and a presumably broad, very collegiate and collectivist nature, if only for reasons of survival. For every representative with high visibility in the direction of the trade union struggle throughout these years has been kidnaped.

Therefore, it was necessary that there be no very outstanding leader, as a means of survival, and that all play a leadership role, one by one.

Thus in the necessary negotiations with the owners--an inherent part of the trade union struggle--a different worker appeared for the negotiations each time, in order to avoid individual focus on the leaders. And this, naturally, has as a consequence on the one hand the fact that no leader has an adequate opportunity to acquire great representative support as an individual, and on the other, that individuality in the struggle is not necessary. Taken into the political realm, it presupposes above all the end of bossism.

[Question] On the military level, there is talk of a so-called "international military force," or a Southern Cone pact, in which Argentina has been playing an outstanding role, and if it is not the leader, is at least the visible head. And on the other hand, looking toward the domestic level, some observers see a certain weakening in the monolithic unity of the army. What can you tell us about this?

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[Answer] Let us say that the Argentine armed forces are in the lead in this international military force. Now being in the lead might not mean being the leader, but the battering ram. We believe it is the latter case. We believe that the leader is Brazil, and that the forceful shock role is being played by Argentina. This is nothing new in South American history.

In the Triple Alliance war in 1865, or if you will, that erroneously so termed, because the Triple Alliance presupposed the participation of Brazil, Uruguay and Argentina, whereas in order for Uruguay to participate, there had been a previous Brazilian-Argentine alliance and an invasion of Uruguay to overthrow the existing government, impose a puppet president and then make the alliance "triple."

In that war in which the gradual genocide of that epoch was imposed upon Paraguay, it is obvious, from the historic results of the process, that the beneficiary and promoter was Brazil. It was the beneficiary because it annexed territory, while Argentina did not, as a result of the war.

However, Gen Bartolome Mitre, president of the Argentine Republic at that time, commanded the unified Triple Alliance army, until he was replaced toward the end of the war by the Brazilian Duke of Caxias.

Why was he replaced? Because there were uprisings in the Argentine interior. The Montoneros rebelled against the oligarchic government of Mitre, and in support of the government of Paraguay, to halt that genocide.

During that period, the two most celebrated Montonero forces, those of "Chacho" Penaloza and Felipe Varela, rebelled. Then the Brazilian empire relieved General Mitre of command of the joint army against Paraguay. It appointed the Duke of Caxias, sending General Mitre to head the oligarchic army headquarters in Buenos Aires, which had to proceed then to wage a war against the Montoneros in the interior, allied with Paraguay.

Therefore, the historical game in which the Brazilian dominant class was the greatest beneficiary and the "dirty work" was done by the Argentine dominant class becomes very clear.

It is not that the Argentine dominant class was more stupid than that in Brazil, but it was historically relatively weaker. And therefore whenever an alliance between Argentina and Brazil occurred in history on the oligarchic level, the Argentine oligarchy lost. It made concessions. At that time it was the aristocracy of Brazilian nobility, while it is now the new Brazilian bourgeoisie.

This was due to the fact that there was a continuity in the Argentine civil wars which did not exist within Brazil, and therefore this weakness, this lack of consolidation in the Argentine oligarchy placed it at a disadvantage in negotiations with Brazil, and it turned to such an alliance precisely because of its weakness. And in doing so, then, the other party imposed the "dirty work" upon it.

Therefore we say that Argentina today, the dictatorship it has, is indeed in the lead of this international military force, but as the battering ram. It is Argentina which is paying the political price of imposing Garcia Meza on Bolivia.

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This Southern Cone pact exists. There are thousands of witnesses to demonstrate that it does. It represents a unification of repressive doctrines in which once again the sad vanguard role in the "dirty work" falls to the Argentine dictatorship, as compared with the Uruguayan, the Chilean, the Bolivian dictatorships.

The Paraguayan dictatorship represents a preexisting model, associated with the others, but not the same. It is more backward. It has joined in the process, but it comes from an earlier concept, and that in Brazil is in a different situation, because it has been in power 15 years. This is evidenced in the number of those who have disappeared, the torture methods, this whole mechanism of sadism, of human destruction, in which the Argentine regime is far ahead of its Southern Cone counterparts. And this is even recognized by the torturers and jailers. There are a number of witnesses to the fact that some of the jailers in Uruguay have made a point of telling certain prisoners that they do not use the same methods as the Argentine military.

Obviously, such a statement does not excuse them. Some of them commit very serious violations against human dignity, and others simply serious violations, nothing more. But our being in the lead is not an accident either, nor a matter of greater sadism or intrinsic cruelty on the part of the individuals who head the Argentine armed forces. The fact is that in the final analysis the social struggle is very much more violent, the social rejection of the model they are seeking to impose is much more violent. And this shows that the triumph is much more violent. It shows that the popular triumph of 1973 shook the foundations of the power of the regime.

This triumph was not equal to striking at the enemy and liquidating the oligarchy, and now we have the counter coup of the reactionary garrisons, but it comes with all the fear they felt with the masses in the streets beginning in 1973, and with the clear awareness that it is "now or never." Either they triumph over the popular movement once and for all or they succumb. And they have said this publicly. Videla himself has said on more than one occasion--when sectors, even conservative ones, have appealed for a more open democracy--in words more or less exactly as follows: "Gentlemen, understand that if we do not triumph, those who will capitalize on this are not the political parties, but the subversives. The subversives have come to be ourselves, that is the fact.

It means in the final analysis that either this reactionary model will triumph for 100 years, as General Galtieri, commander in chief of the army, has proclaimed, or a revolutionary model will triumph.

And why do they need to impose terrorism?

Because if they do not, they will lose power.

This is the basic problem found in all dictatorships.

The popular upsurge was evidenced in Argentina in 1973, it was evidenced in Chile with the Popular Unity government of President Salvador Allende, it was manifested in Bolivia with the government of General Torres in 1971, and the triumph now, in

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these elections, of Siles Suazo, and it was seen in the upsurge which the Broad Front achieved at one time in Uruguay.

In other words, the development of the popular movement at the beginning of the 1970s, varying in background and in the degree of challenging power, achieved a level of challenge to the status quo which made it necessary for the economic reorganization the imperialists sought to implement to be effected in a repressive fashion never before seen in any of these countries.

This level of violence, of sadism, in order to contain the popular mobilization is a sine qua non for the defense of the regime and the reorganization of the international division of labor on the regional level.

Concerning the internal contradictions within the Argentine armed forces, I will first clarify one thing. If these contradictions do exist, what is not certain is that pro-Pinochet and democratic sectors are involved. The contradictions exist. And why is this?

These contradictions exist due to weakness, because the alternative ways of continuing the process are being discussed. This is the basis of the debate.

They exist between the army and the navy, and within the army as well. What is being debated in this whole process? How far can this concentration of capital without a political base continue? How long is it possible to continue without losing everything?

This is the debate between General Viola and General Menendez, which has its public manifestation in the press, involving a seemingly historical discussion. It is a discussion of tactics, of procedures, on intensification of the war or regarding it as finished. It is not a difference on the strategic model, or a disagreement between democrats and pro-Pinochet factions.

There are other sectors which, although they do not believe that the victory over the popular movement is won, tried to urge (the public manifestation of this was Lanusse in 1977) that it was necessary to stop where they were and begin democratic institutionalization, or else be faced with an insurrection.

At that time, as is known, General Lanusse was imprisoned, and his press secretary and editor of the book in which he maintained that thesis, was kidnaped. In other words, this concept clearly lost out.

These individuals might have been regarded as democrats, but they ended up in prison or kidnaped.

The differences existing between Viola, Videla, Menendez, Suarez Mason, Galtieri, etc., are differences of a tactical nature, as well as personal ambitions which also exist and private individual economic interests, within these same class interests, which at a given moment could also come into conflict. This is the case with the individual interests of Viola with regard to the plan of Martinez de Hoz. Viola belongs to the oligarchy of the interior, the livestock

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breeders, and therefore he has an interest in the reactivation of the slaughtering and cold storage industry and the exclusion from the plan for agreement with Brazil of the sale of livestock on the hoof to Brazil, since this affects his personal interests as a landowner.

This is the origin of the contradictions which exist and of their current manifestations.

The designation of Viola, on the basis of an internal agreement in the armed forces, should have been unanimous. In other words, each of the three commanders in chief has the veto right, and Viola was vetoed by the navy, in a political power play by the navy against the army. For the navy vetoed Viola as a candidate and proposed the present commander in chief, General Galtieri, in order to break up the alliance between Galtieri and Viola. And if Galtieri accepted the presidency, he would have had to retire, that is he would also have lost the command of the army troops.

In this type of power struggle, a political proposal supporting the navy, through Massera, was put forth, seeking to speed up the development of a movement in support of the armed forces somewhat farther to the left than Viola wanted, with more concessions--because of a clearer and closer view of the dangers, in an attempt to establish a social base.

The navy adopted this proposal and challenged the power of the army in the leadership of the joint command. This is one contradiction.

The other within the army lies in the fact that there are two factions of officers fearful about the Viola period. One of these is defined by its economic program. It is the line which sustains and supports Minister Martinez de Hoz at all costs and beyond, and which therefore fears that Viola's political project will cut off the development of the economic model. The others are more closely linked with repression and they fear that the effort toward a political maneuver to win forces in support of the dictatorship presupposes that those who are most publicly compromised in connection with the torture, kidnappings and assassinations will be subject to negotiation. In other words, they fear that they will be subjects or pawns in the negotiation--being individually identified as agents of the filthy war, in the political alliance which Viola might seek in order to form a movement in support of the government.

These two factions in contradiction are fearful of the Viola period more than of Viola himself. For I repeat that Viola's political plan is not the man, but was drafted by the joint general staff and approved by the military junta. The very political personality of Viola, what he must say, do and how he should dress, is planned on the general staff level. That is the case. This is no invention, for there is evidence in written documents.

Thus the fear is of the new era he is trying to inaugurate, theoretically one of consolidation, but they are aware that there is no balance of forces to justify this consolidation in the final analysis. And therefore, the maneuver can be very dangerous for them and could end in defeat, bearing in mind the previous Argentine political experience.

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These are the contradictions existing within the armed forces, which are to be found currently.

To the extent that the political deterioration of the dictatorship becomes more acute, a development which in our view is irreversible, these contradictions will increase. Naturally, all of these contradictions will become more acute and others will even appear, and at a given moment, the process will take on the aspect of street clashes between mobilized masses and the repressive forces. And there is no need to stress that other types of contradictions which if they exist today are still latent and without manifestation will develop then.

This also takes into account the class composition of the Argentine army, in which all of the soldiers are of the people, the noncommissioned officers are of very humble origin, and a large number of the officers are of petit bourgeois extraction. In a process in which all of the social strata in the national structure clash, it is logical that these petit bourgeois sectors would feel a serious conflict of interests if they have to impose mass repression in the street, as happened with the Cordobazo.

[Question] Comrade Firmenich, the long tradition of struggle in the organization you head, not only on Argentine territory, but even its solidarity with and support of the revolutionary process in Nicaragua, and other revolutionary processes in Latin America, is well known.

In this connection, you have also spoken of the sizable casualties the movement has suffered. For this reason we would like to ask you what the immediate prospects for the struggle are, and at the same time, what are the main tasks you propose to carry out?

[Answer] As to our solidarity with other liberation movements and political parties in Latin America, there is a very clear political explanation. Obviously the model and example of San Martin in Argentina is something that each of us learned from early childhood. Latin American integration is an inherent part of the Montonero project, not just now, but since the last century. The Montonero leader Felipe Varela himself, who rebelled in an expression of solidarity with Paraguay, in the province of Catamarca, adjacent to Chile, i.e. very far away from Paraguay, rebelled under the slogan of "American union," which is the only solution to the problem posed by the developing oligarchies. If one studies the continent he will find that there were also Montoneros in Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, that the first Montonero leader in the Plate River region was Artigas, and, naturally, in the war of independence the closest link in the army of San Martin was with the Chilean people, and then in Peru, the Peruvian army was built on the basis of the Montoneros. In other words, being a Montonero has always meant being pro-Latin American.

The popular Argentine movement deriving from the Montoneros has come through the Irigoyen and the Peron eras, making it inevitable that the current Montoneros, the present Peronist Montonero, is a Latin American by origin. And we do not conceive of our liberation other than within the framework of the Great Fatherland, an expression very dear to us and almost binding upon a militant in the Argentine

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popular movement. In other words the Great Fatherland of Bolivar and San Martin. This is a part of our origin and is the basic and fundamental explanation for our political attitude.

In addition, it is obvious that there exist popular movements within this political framework--the case of the Sandinists which you mentioned--which are meritorious in themselves, although they do not have this background, in full solidarity against a tyranny such as that of Somoza. There is a true revolution which is shaking the reactionary foundations on the continent and which, naturally, the Argentine people are following with the greatest attention, with great solidarity and with full awareness that the Argentine dictatorship put its own prestige and its own future salvation at risk in the defense of Somoza. It did so publicly, moreover, and with logistic support. Therefore, the support of the Sandinist revolution was for us a moral obligation, from every point of view. It was a most fully justified political need, based on the origins of our Latin American brotherhood, justified by the very merits of the Sandinist Front, which was able to win the solidarity of numerous forces in other parts of the world which had nothing to do with the Latin American brotherhood or our historic roots.

Concerning our casualties and the future. Very often, many other comrades and political forces have asked us about the problem of the casualties, that is to say the cost in lives, in cadres, of the struggle we have waged. With the tacit motive of undermining the struggle to safeguard the cadres or the organization. We maintain another, entirely different, concept. To begin with, when we say "Fatherland or death," it means just that, and is an absolutely categorical option. We have historic background in this. The Montoneros of the last century were to be annihilated to the last man. In that era they represented a social force which had no historical possibility of imposing itself, because it represented an emerging bourgeoisie which was technically very backward in its development, facing the expanding British imperialism. But currently, these Montoneros represent the workers' class against capitalism in crisis. In other words, the destiny of the proposal from the point of view of its social base is very different. And on the other hand, we maintain that if the role of the Montoneros of the last century fell to us, we have lived it, for the simple reason that the only way to develop the main contradiction in favor of the popular sector is by fighting. From what little we know, the contradiction is defined as the unity and struggle of opposites. Only through this struggle is contradiction developed. Thus we, with all of these definitions, have taken on the struggle whatever the final outcome may be.

Even if a computer could have shown us 50 or 20 years ago that this struggle would be impossible, as the triumph of the Montoneros in the last century was impossible, we would have done the same. Exactly the same, for we would have changed nothing. It is our decision to fight. For we do not fight for triumph for ourselves or for our generation, but for our people, which does not end with us. We have said many times that we will never suffer the dishonor of having our children tell us tomorrow that they lack a given situation due to the lack of our ability to struggle. This is the basis of our decision to fight. On the other hand, there is a political assessment. We have very great faith in our people, and in our working class.

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The theme of Peronism is very controversial outside Argentina. There are those who think that it is a disgrace that the Argentine people have been Peronists, while we think quite the contrary. We believe that this political identity incorporates a class identity and national identity, both things, and a clear antioligarchic and anti-imperialist identification from the beginning. Peron won the elections under the slogan "Braden or Peron" (Braden was the U.S. ambassador). The most luminous example of our best origins was Evita. Eva Peron, who defined Peronism from the beginning as an antioligarchic force, has bequeathed us several phrases which are eternal slogans for us, such as the following: "With or without bloodshed, the damned race of the oligarchs will disappear in this century" and "The fatherland will cease to be colonial, or the flag will fly over its ruins." Thus the origins of our confidence in belonging to this movement lie in all these elements. Confidence in its capacity for struggle, confidence in its own historic transformation, having encountered hindrances preventing the revolution from becoming more profound. With its founding leader dead, having had sufficient vitality and awareness of its internal contradictions to develop and transform itself and overcome those hindrances which blocked the revolution, both in 1955 and in 1976. Other revolutionary forces in Argentina, at the time of the coup d'etat, believed first that a very rapid advance would be made toward rebellion, because with Peron dead, the brake on the masses was gone. This did not occur. With the death of Peron, the leader who unified the masses disappeared, and now this leadership must be replaced with qualitatively superior leadership, not only in thinking but in organization. Not the leadership of a single hero, but organizational leadership. And then, many became discouraged, because they presumed there would be dictatorship for a time and that the popular movement would remain crushed.

We pursued our entire initial struggle alone, aware that there was an ebb of the masses at this time, with the following idea: We needed, as an organized force, as a single organized force of the popular movement at that time, to develop the battle to hinder the advance of the dictatorial project, which would allow the reorganization of the popular movement from which the counteroffensive force would emerge. With this formulation, we launched the resistance in 1976, on the day after the coup d'etat. We believe that the basis for triumph lies always with the masses, essentially in the masses. It is not in the limited weapons a revolutionary movement may have, but in depriving the enemy of its weapons, its many weapons. Disarming the enemy. Not only taking its weapons from it physically, but disarming it morally, politically, and incapacitating it to use these weapons. And we would cite the recent revolutionary examples of which we know, in Iran and Nicaragua, where we see that in the end it was thus. It is the people in the streets, along with the vanguard directing the struggle, which disarm and in the end crush the reactionary military force.

We make of organization a weapon, simply a weapon, and therefore, we sacrifice organization in the battle for political prestige. We have 5,000 fewer men, but how many more masses? This is the important thing.

We do not aspire to a little organization of 5,000 men, but to a movement of millions. We are fighting for leadership of the entire Peronist movement, not just our little part. We are fighting for historical transformation, this historical improvement in Peronism. And this is being done with political

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leadership, essentially, with a political line which wins over the masses, which proves correct, which has moral force, which is politically correct, which has combat and organizational capacity, no matter how many deaths it takes. This is our political line, and for this reason we have consciously sacrificed our organization, adapting ourselves to this political value, and we are persuaded that we are winning, and not losing.

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COUNTRY SECTION

CUBA

FIGURES FOR 1981 BUDGET, 1981-1985 PLAN REPORTED

Five-Year Development Plan

Havana BOHEMIA in Spanish 2 Jan 81 p 56

[Text] The national socioeconomic development plan for the 1981-1985 period governs the activities for each one of the years of the 5-year period. It is obligatory for all central organs and organisms of the state, local people's government organs and production and service enterprises and units.

The following indicators are for the entire economy:

	1981-1985
Growth in overall social product (annual %)	5.1
Volume of gross investment (MMP)	15,400
Growth in retail trade (annual %)	3.5
Growth in work productivity (annual %)	3.3
By sectors:	
Industry	2.3
Construction	3.9
Agricultural-livestock	2.6
Transportation	3.2
Growth in wage fund (annual %)	3.6

The following standard of living indicators are guaranteed:

	1981-1985
Housing units finished	200,000
Growth in installed capacity of daycare centers (annual %)	2.5
Growth in number of students beginning semiboarding primary education (annual %)	1.6
Growth in enrollment of students in intermediate education (annual %)	0.5
Of this, growth in boarding system (annual %)	2.0
Growth in enrollment of students in advanced education (annual %)	4.5
Growth in number of beds in medical care facilities (annual %)	2.1

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1981 Development Plan

Havana BOHEMIA in Spanish 2 Jan 81 p 57

[Text] The national socioeconomic development plan for 1981 governs activities from 1 January 1981 to 31 December 1981. It is obligatory for all central organs and organisms of the state, local people's government organs and production and service enterprises and units.

The following indicators are for the entire economy in 1981:

Growth in overall social product	3.9%
Volume of gross investment (MMP)	2,850
Growth in retail trade	3.7%
Growth in work productivity	3.0%
By sectors:	
Industry	2.0%
Construction	4.7%
Agricultural-livestock	2.4%
Transportation	3.5%
Growth in wage fund	6.7%

The following standard of living indicators are guaranteed:

Housing units finished	20,000
Growth in installed capacity of daycare centers	2.1%
Growth in number of students beginning semiboarding primary education	1.0%
Growth in enrollment of students in intermediate boarding schools	2.0%
Growth in enrollment of students in advanced education	4.0%
Growth in number of beds in medical care facilities	2.0%

1981 State Budget

Havana BOHEMIA in Spanish 2 Jan 81 p 58

[Text] The 1981 state budget is composed of the following income and expenditures.

	Millions of Pesos
Income	
Contributions from state sector of the economy	11,082.2
Taxes and other contributions from nonstate sector of economy	20.2
Taxes and fees from the people	<u>98.9</u>
Total income	11,201.3

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	Millions of Pesos
Expenditures	
Financing of productive sphere	4,672.3
Financing of housing and community services	412.1
Financing of education and public health	1,848.3
Financing of other social, cultural and scientific activities	1,436.4
Financing of administration expenses of people's government organs, courts, attorney general's office and other state organs and organisms	675.1
Financing of defense and internal order	842.1
Financing of other activities	766.8
Reserve	<u>544.3</u>
Total expenditures	11,197.4
Surplus	3.9

The central budget for 1981 is:

	Millions of Pesos
Income	8,964.6
Expenditures	<u>8,960.7</u>
Surplus	3.9

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COUNTRY SECTION

CUBA

EFFECTS OF DIVORCE ON CHILDREN DISCUSSED

Havana BOHEMIA in Spanish 9 Jan 81 pp 32-33

[Article by Dr Luis Gil, professor of medical psychology at the Plaza de la Revolucion Community Teaching Polyclinic]

[Text] One of the most difficult issues to tackle, one of the most discussed and one that is an object of concern for parents is divorce and how it is handled. Before going into detail as to how to proceed when faced with such a situation, we feel it necessary to lay emphasis on certain questions.

When they have once produced a family, parents ought to give serious thought as to how they are going to go about it if they decide to separate and, furthermore, they must think about how they are going to break the news to their children in order to avoid inflicting on them, through ignorance, some trauma which may perhaps be irreparable in later years. Moreover, a family ought to explore all possible avenues leading to a solution before arriving at the extreme step of separation and ought to profoundly analyze what stability in the home means to the children.

When a couple decides to get married with an eye to producing a family, both partners ought to be quite sure of the step they are taking, of the responsibility it involves and of the change they will have to undergo in terms of their future functions as husband and wife and later as father and mother.

We are not going to give a literal definition of divorce, but, roughly speaking, we can say that it is the dissolution of the lawful bond that has united two people who at one time thought that they would be happy in that union.

If in the course of the marriage there have been no offspring, we do not believe that many problems are involved in a separation; but if there are children, all this changes and proper handling of the situation is required to avoid psychological traumas or changes in the children.

Many writers regard a child of divorced parents as a "problem child" or assume that he may be a neurotic individual. As for us, we feel that, if the divorce is properly handled by the couple, the alterations or symptoms referred to can be avoided.

From the legal point of view, divorce guarantees the child social security, but this has nothing to do with the changes that may take place in his emotional development. The avoidance of these problems is up to the parents who, even though they

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may be divorced, still have the same obligations. This is the same image that the children should retain, that is, that divorce is no reason for losing one of one's parents.

Faced with having to stop living with mama or papa, it is natural and normal for a child to feel somewhat strange and for him to insist on the presence of the former.

We would say that divorce is a kind of "adjustment" situation to which the child must adapt himself with the aid of his own parents and other members of the family with whom he lives.

We have often observed that, when they divorce one another, parents do not give any thought to how to satisfy the psychological needs of the child, fundamentally that of love, which is one of the most important of them, and they remove themselves from the home and the child. And they are precisely the ones primarily responsible for providing the child with the love he needs for, if he is not given enough love, the child may readily think that he has lost one of those dearest to him.

Occasionally we notice that this separation or creation of distance from the children is produced because the parents retain animosity toward one another, reject one another and have feelings of aggression, sometimes to an extreme degree. And this is transmitted to the child in the form of words, gestures, judgments, actions, comments, etc.

We feel that both the mother and the father have an obligation to provide their children with a good opinion of the other spouse so that the child retains the most appropriate image of each of them.

We must take into account the fact that being a husband or wife is one function and being a father or mother is another. A spouse may have behaved very badly for specific reasons and be a "bad man" as a husband but be very good as a father and capable of psychologically satisfying his children.

As for the wife, she may be a great mother, with all of the necessary qualities, but may have stopped loving or does not get along harmoniously with her husband.

This aspect of the two functions is vital in the handling of children of divorced parents. It must be made clear that this point is incumbent not only on the parents, but also on the rest of the family living with the child because all of them have the obligation to help maintain a positive image of the parents.

We have also seen cases where the parents delegate this function to grandparents, uncles and aunts, etc. This is a serious mistake. Not even out of the feeling of pity that sometimes emerges within the family should parents delegate their responsibilities to other persons.

A very important point in the handling of the divorce is communication, the social relation the divorced couple should maintain. We believe that this is not easy and requires a great deal of maturity on the part of both spouses, but let us remember what we said at the outset: The child has and ought to have the best

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image of his papa or his mama, to see that both of them do not live together but talk things over, are capable of conversing with one another and of being interested in his problems, that is, his health, his games, his friends, his club, his school, etc.

If this is achieved, the child will feel secure, understand that the two most important figures for him are concerned with his affairs, with what happens to him, with his achievements and see that they are capable of helping him to solve his problems.

When children ask questions about the situation, we must not be afraid to confront them with the truth, but with a truth that is compatible with their level of development. In simple language they should be told that mama and papa are not going to go on living together but that they will still be their parents and still love them and take care of them, as always. If this is not left at mere words, if it is carried out in the form of real deeds, the child will achieve a perfect adjustment.

There is one point which we also want to stress and that is what happens to the child if the parents remarry.

Just as before, we must always tell the child the truth, but each of the partners must be certain that the person with whom he or she is going to set up a new household will also play the role of mother or father, even though he or she has never done so before. Sometimes this does not happen and we forget that we have married a woman who has one or more children or vice versa and, on the contrary, we must bear well in mind what this involves and the responsibility we have taken on. The child must fully accept the other figure, see in him or her an extension of the father or the mother, someone who is just as concerned as or has the same authority as his true parents.

We must emphasize the fact that, in conversations with their children, the father or the mother should help them accept this other person as a new father or mother.

It is, therefore, important that, prior to the new marriage, the kind of affection that exists between the partner who has been chosen and the children he or she has from a previous marriage be considered. Love must not be imposed on someone; rather it has to grow little by little as a result of affectionate and proper treatment.

If we are capable of doing this, if we are capable of achieving communication among the members of this group of people, a social relation that decisively shapes the child's family, everything will be completely accepted and nothing [adverse] will happen. We know that affection plays an important role, but more important is the child's emotional balance and adjustment, which is why we have to bear this well in mind.

As we said at the outset, divorce in itself traumatizes no one; what can cause trouble is the way it is handled. We must be extremely careful in the way we behave after a separation to see to it that the children's emotional development is not affected due to an improper attitude maintained by the adults.

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COUNTRY SECTION

CUBA

NATIONAL CENTER FOR ANIMAL HEALTH ACTIVITIES NOTED

Havana BOHEMIA in Spanish 9 Jan 81 pp 90-91

[Article by H. Nunez Lemus]

[Text] The National Center for Animal Health (CENSA) came into being at the initiative of our commander-in-chief, Fidel Castro, who in 1969 pointed out the need for creating a research center of this type to conduct all sorts of projects designed to develop our livestock industry. At that time, since they could not count on getting the 60 veterinarians the project called for, a group of practitioners of human medicine was selected to get things going under the jurisdiction of the National Center for Scientific Research (CENIC).

CENSA's goals were oriented toward research in the field of animal health, genetics, and reproduction, offering industries specialized in these areas scientific and technical services and, lastly, training highly specialized scientific personnel.

Since its founding, veterinarians, biologists and biochemists, who have been conducting studies on these subjects abroad, have been added to the specialists in human medicine.

With the acquisition of land in 1970, construction was begun on the CENSA, since all activity relating to animal health continued to remain within the CENIC Farm and Livestock Department. And it was in 1976 during the process of political and administrative reorganization of the country that the National Center for Animal Health came into being with its present organizational structure.

Work Completed

Despite the undeniable "youth" of the center, to date 743 research projects have been completed, 474 scientific and technical services for livestock enterprises have been provided, the defense of 31 theses written by doctoral candidates in the sciences has been made possible, it has participated in 34 national and 33 international conferences, 23 resolutions to expand production and 10 to introduce new production have been passed, 15 contracts are in force with livestock enterprises and 23 topics of research are or will be in their final phases during this 5-year period.

In the field of scientific and technical production, this year the CENSA outlined 190 tasks pertaining to animals as a whole: gestation and birth rates of cattle,

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reducing the mortality rate among calves and more suitable breeds of beef cattle for the country.

To do this job, the CENSA relies on a staff of 432 workers, 214 of whom are women. Another detail worth noting is the fact that 108 of the 133 comrades devoting themselves to research are women.

Basic Science

Under the direction of Dr Libertad Garcia, the Department of Genetics and Production has five laboratories for research on genetics, cytogenetics, reproduction and sperm biochemistry.

The clinic is headed by Dr Elisa Aznar. This is a department that is unique in Cuba and, insofar as it is a clinic in the service of veterinary medicine, its departments include internal medicine, X-ray, obstetrics, gynecology and a clinical laboratory. All the techniques the department uses have been experimented with before in the USSR, but later developed and modified to conform to our realities and with the advice of Soviet experts.

The department has cubicles for the hospitalization of animals, treatment rooms, pre- and postoperative, operation rooms for major and minor surgery and also, for the analysis of viscera, it depends on the modern system of parascopy. There are also animal delivery and radiology rooms.

As for the Department of Microbiology, headed by Dr Lidia Tablada, it has five research laboratories and two more that serve them. Their functions are concentrated on infectious and contagious diseases which attack newborn or adult livestock and inflict damage on the reproductive organs, such as parasitosis, brucellosis, mastitis, hepatic facciola and the terrible IMBB, this last-named one of those diseases that has most decimated the livestock population.

The CENSA is headed by Dr Rosa Elena Simeon, who explained:

"There is no other center, nor even one that resembles this one, in Latin America. To be sure, there are some institutions devoted to specific specialties, but not to solving overall problems. They are simply institutions in the service of given firms. There is no institution in Latin America organized like ours, comprehensive and one which is tackling the livestock situation, that can count on any investment."

Regarding the proposals made by Fidel at the end of the 1960's, Dr Simeon said:

"I believe that we cannot yet say that we have responded to everything our supreme leader proposed. But we are working on all his directives and we can say that, while some will require years to attain the goals involved, we go on working toward them and do not slacken our efforts."

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COUNTRY SECTION

EL SALVADOR

CDHES REPORTS DISEASE OUTBREAKS AT REFUGEE CENTERS

PA200324 Havana PRELA in Spanish 1759 GMT 19 Jan 81

[Pool item]

[Text] San Salvador, 19 Jan (ANN)--The Human Rights Commission of El Salvador [CDHES] has reported outbreaks of measles, smallpox [viruela], chicken pox and poliomyelitis in the shelters maintained by the Catholic Church for thousands of Salvadorans who fled from rural areas because of repression.

Msgr Oscar Arnulfo Romero, bishop [as received] of San Salvador who was killed by rightists in this country in March, 1980, had opened the doors of the churches in the name of "the commitment to the poor, the helpless and the oppressed and the thousands of persons who are being persecuted by the armed forces and the paramilitary organizations."

The shelters began to receive increasing numbers of persons as the army and the national guard began to carry out "clean-up" operations late last year. These operations consist of burning towns and forcing the peasants to leave the areas where they reside in an attempt to reduce support for the guerrillas.

The CDHES made this charge and asked local authorities to bury "the number of bodies which are in the streets of towns as a result of the confrontations."

The CDHES has been attacked several times and several of its members were killed as a result of its campaign to denounce the repression, the disappearance of persons and the "atrocious" murders committed by military forces and paramilitary organizations.

For the past 5 days, the CDHES headquarters has been without communications because the authorities suspended its telephone service.

The CDHES also reports that factories, government agencies, banks and the Salvadoran Social Security Institute are under military control.

In addition, the commission reiterates a charge made by employees of the Central Reserve Bank, who maintained that the bank's management had cooperated with representatives of the Criminal Investigations Section who came to obtain the names and addresses of labor leaders and workers. Finally, the CDHES reported that at the National Children's Home in San Miguel, 164 km from this capital, there are 300 refugees who came from the northern part of San Miguel and Morazan departments.
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COUNTRY SECTION

HONDURAS

BRIEFS

PRIEST ARRESTED AFTER CHARGING MASSACRES--San Jose, 16 Feb (PL)--Priest Fausto Millas was arrested in Honduras when he returned from Mexico City where he charged that more than 600 persons were massacred by the Honduran and Salvadoran armies. Father Millas was arrested last Saturday at the airport in San Pedro Sula, the Christian Movement for Justice in Honduras reported today. Father Millas said at the Tribunal of the Peoples which met last week in Mexico City, that the Honduran and Salvadoran armies killed more than 600 persons along the banks of the Sumpul River which is the border between Honduras and El Salvador. The Christian Movement for Justice in Honduras says that during the last 3 months, the Honduran Army has been persecuting priests and persons in the departments along the border with El Salvador because of the aid they are giving to some 30,000 Salvadoran refugees. Father Millas charged that a horrible partnership exists between the Honduran Government and the Salvadoran Christian Democratic Military Junta with the complicity of the Honduran church top officials, who have not said anything regarding the arrest of Father Millas. [Text] [PA170428 Havana PRELA in Spanish 2153 GMT 16 Feb 81]

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COUNTRY SECTION

JAMAICA

BRITAIN'S RIDLEY VISITS; LOAN AGREEMENT SIGNED

PA241328 Havana PRELA in Spanish 2340 GMT 23 Jan 81

[Text] Kingston, 23 Jan (PL)--Great Britain has granted Jamaica a loan of \$14.4 million to be used beginning 31 March.

The agreement was signed today by Prime Minister Edward Seaga and British Minister of State Nicholas Ridley, who is on an official 3-day visit to this country.

The loan is payable in 25 years at 6 percent interest, with a grace period of 3 years.

On signing the agreement, Seaga said that one part of the loan will be used to purchase electrical generating equipment and another part for police vehicles. The remainder will be placed at the disposal of the private sector for purchases abroad and for paying debts.

As part of his visit to Jamaica, Ridley held a news conference today. In referring to the situation in El Salvador, he said that Great Britain will not intervene on behalf of any of the parties, although he refused to criticize the violations of human rights committed by the Christian Democratic junta.

Ridley defended the sale of British weapons to Chile, saying that he saw nothing improper in this action, since the former labor government sold arms to Argentina where, he said, conditions are very similar to those of Chile. Ridley said that his country sells arms to practically anyone, as long as the weapons are not used against their peoples or against Great Britain.

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